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We examine Latin American foreign exchange intervention in a framework where the exchange 
rate regime is endogenous and there exists an inefficient, equilibrium foreign exchange 
intervention bias.  The model suggests that greater central bank independence is associated with 
lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market, and also with leaning-against-the-wind 
intervention.  Both results are confirmed by data from 13 Latin American countries. 
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A stylized fact of foreign exchange markets is that sterilized interventions by central banks 
cannot influence exchange rates on a permanent basis.  Unlike the costs, the benefits of 
intervention are far from being obvious.  So why do central banks continue to intervene?  One 
possible answer is that intervention is not exogenously carried out by central banks.  Rather, it 
may be an endogenous outcome of the strategic interaction between central banks and private 
market participants. 
The model in this paper thus endogenizes foreign exchange intervention only to find a 
nonzero equilibrium amount of intervention as a result.  Such an “intervention bias” is analogous 
to the well-known “inflationary bias” of Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon games of monetary 
policy.  These explain why zero inflation cannot occur as the central bank intervenes to stabilize 
its currency’s domestic value.  Central banks of industrialized countries are mainly concerned 
with the management of the domestic value of their currencies, not the external.  Thus the 
literature on monetary policy games has received widespread attention.  Does one need an 
exchange rate policy game still?  Why not use two separate monetary policy games (one for the 
domestic and one for the foreign country) to explain the countries’ relative price levels? 
Two separate monetary policy games may lead to optimal price levels that might 
conceivably be at odds with purchasing power parity.  PPP cannot be dismissed because it is the 
basis for most theories of international price determination and sets the conditions under which 
international markets adjust to attain long-term equilibrium.  To properly evaluate the external 
value of a currency, one thus needs to replace two separate monetary policy games with an 
exchange rate policy game. 
Section 2 fills this gap and sets an exchange rate policy game to model endogenous 
intervention.  We find an inefficient, equilibrium foreign exchange intervention bias, and that 
greater central bank independence is associated with both lesser intervention in the foreign 
exchange market and leaning-against-the-wind intervention. Section 3 shows that these results 


















M                                                                                                                     (1) 
where tM  is domestic money supply at t , 
T
tM  is money supply target, tE  is nominal exchange 
rate (home currency price of foreign currency), and TtE  is domestic central bank target for the 
nominal exchange rate.  Central bank parameter φ  tracks the degree of intervention in the 
foreign exchange market.  It is zero under free float and approaches plus or minus infinity for a 
fixed exchange rate.  Leaning-against-the-wind intervention occurs if )0,(−∞∈φ , whereas 
leaning-into-the-wind intervention occurs if ),0( ∞∈φ .  This rule was pioneered by Marston 
(1985), and was subsequently employed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 632). 
If 0=φ , the central bank focuses exclusively on money supply target, refraining from 
any intervention in the foreign exchange market.  If ±∞→φ , the central bank focuses 
exclusively on its nominal exchange rate target, and shows no concern about money supply.  
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Leaning against the wind is the intervention operation that attempts to move the exchange rate in 
the opposite direction from its current trend, and leaning into the wind is motivated by the central 
bank’s desire to support current exchange rate trends.  Here both types of intervention are carried 
out by changes in TtM .  Whether such changes are sterilized is not discussed.  Non-sterilized 
intervention is just a combination of monetary change and (sterilized) intervention.  So we 
consider the influence of monetary policy on exchange rates, not overall intervention.  This can 
be more useful for Latin America and other emerging countries than perhaps to the United States 
and Japan, where the monetary authority plays a negligible role in foreign exchange intervention.  
The target level for the exchange rate is exogenous.  In a leaning-against-the-wind intervention, 
for instance, TE  might represent past levels of the exchange rate.  This follows from the idea of 
smoothing exchange rate fluctuations.  If the exchange rate was at a desirable level in the 
previous period, then deviations from the target level are countered. 
The domestic central bank is assumed to intervene in the foreign exchange market at the 
end of time period s  to react to shocks that materialized between the end of 1−s  and the end of 
s .  Central bank’s loss function CBtL  is 
( ) ( ) ( )2 22
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where parameter (0,1)ρ ∈  is a discount factor applied to future losses of the central bank related 
to its exchange rate management, (0, )ψ ∈ ∞  is a factor of proportionality for the costs of 
intervention through the portfolio balance channel, (0, )µ∈ ∞  is a parameter capturing the costs 
of the expectations channel of intervention, (0, )γ ∈ ∞  weighs the central bank aversion to 
deviations from its exchange rate target, ( , )esφ ∈ −∞ ∞  is the central bank intervention expected 
by a representative speculator, and tU  is a domestic residents’ generic utility function. 
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where (0,1)σ ∈  is a discount factor related to the speculator’s future losses. 
 The first and second terms in brackets on the right-hand side in (2) proxy the costs of 
intervention through the portfolio balance channel and expectations channel respectively.  
Central bank losses are assumed to increase more than proportionately with the volume of these 
interventions.  Compared to individual private currency dealers, central banks are bigger 
participants in the market.  Yet intervention volumes are very tiny if compared to daily turnovers 
on foreign exchange markets.  So it is possible for the exchange rate not to be affected by the 
volume of intervention itself.  But intervention can still affect the exchange rate through the 
portfolio balance channel (first term in brackets on the right-hand side in (2)).  The volume of 
intervention does not matter if 0=ψ , and it matters if 0>ψ , in which case purchases (sales) of 
foreign currency impact the exchange rate positively (negatively). 
In equation (2) there is also room for central bank intervention to work through the 
expectations channel.  Actual higher-than-expected intervention may catch the speculator off 
balance, thereby leading to a correction in the exchange rate.  So the second term in brackets on 
the right-hand side in (2) allows the central bank to exploit the divergence between actual and 
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expected intervention in order to influence the exchange rate.  The expectations channel does not 
matter if 0=µ , and it is operative if 0>µ , in which case actual larger-than-expected purchases 
(sales) of foreign currency impact the exchange rate positively (negatively). 
The third term in brackets on the right-hand side in (2) tracks the fact that central bank 
losses increase more than proportionately with nominal exchange rate changes that are not 
caused by the relative state of domestic macroeconomic “fundamentals”.  The last term on the 
right-hand side in (2) shows that the central bank not only cares about exchange rate policy but 
also considers the utility (wellbeing) of domestic residents. 
The first term in brackets on the right-hand side in (3) captures the speculator’s aversion 
to being fooled by the central bank.  When that actually happens, the speculator’s losses increase 
more than proportionately.  The second term on the right-hand side in (3) shows the speculator 
considering the losses coming from exchange rate policy after correcting for his gains from 
utility.  The strategic interaction between central bank and speculator is assumed to come into 
play only after a shock to the nominal exchange rate has materialized.  Since such a shock can 
also result from the interaction between the various sorts of decision made by a number of 
market participants, the assumption above rules out intra-speculators’ behavior, thereby making 
it possible to treat distinct traders as a unique representative speculator. 
Time periods are disconnected, and thus minimization of (2) and (3) is carried out as a 
repeated play of one-shot games.  Moreover, although foreign exchange intervention is assumed 
to affect the nominal exchange rate from the start, this is not a full model of exchange rate 
determination.  Yet wherever exchange rate model is in the black box, we assume the utility 
function not to depend on the nominal exchange rate, as in models where classical dichotomy 
holds (e.g. Stockman 1987, p. 17, n. 13, and Da Silva 2002). 
Choice variables of central bank and speculator are φ  and eφ  respectively.  Because 
interaction takes place after the occurrence of a shock, this can be perceived by both central bank 
and speculator, who simultaneously set tφ  and etφ .  As in Barro-Gordon-type models, equal 
status of players leads to Nash equilibrium. 
Central bank’s reaction function to the speculator’s expectation can be found from 
minimization of its loss at t , taking etφ  as given.  Partially differentiating (2) relative to tφ , and 
















1                                                                         (4) 
In reaction function (4), φ  affects both utility and nominal exchange rate in particular ways that 
are left implicit in ttU φ∂∂  and ttE φ∂∂  respectively. 
Partially differentiating (3) relative to etφ  (taking tφ  as given), and setting the result to 
zero yields the speculator’s reaction function, i.e. 
t
e
t φφ =                                                                                                                                (5) 
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Thus equilibrium intervention is more than proportionately lower, the greater the costs of 
intervention through the portfolio channel (the bigger ψ ).  And there exists a nonzero 
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equilibrium “intervention bias” ( 0≠tφ ).  For instance, ( ) ttTtttt EEEU φγφ ∂∂−=∂∂  for 
T
tt EE >  obtains only by chance.  Equilibrium intervention will be leaning against the wind 
( 0<tφ ) if the central bank considers the management of the exchange rate ( ( ) ttTtt EEE φγ ∂∂− ) 
more important than the domestic residents’ wellbeing ( ttU φ∂∂ ).  Leaning-into-the-wind 
intervention ( 0>tφ ) will be optimal otherwise. 
The intervention bias is arguably inefficient because the costs involved are not offset by 
any benefits.  There are no benefits because the nonzero amount of intervention is fully 
anticipated by the speculator (equation (5)).  So intervention cannot succeed in preventing the 
impact of the shock to the exchange rate.  Almekinders (1995) has pioneered this intervention 
bias of discretionary exchange rate policy.  But our model is simpler and further considers both 
alternative types of intervention and domestic wellbeing.  Unlike in Almekinders’ model, where 
central bank leadership removes the intervention bias, this persists in our model regardless of the 
players’ status. 
The central bank acts as a Stackelberg leader if it takes action before the speculator and 
thus knows the exact shape of the speculator’s reaction function.  So it is able to pick the point 
on the speculator’s reaction function that minimizes its own losses.  It thus sets tφ , and etφ  gets 
determined endogenously.  Equation (6) again obtains in the Stackelberg equilibrium.  (To see 
this, substitute (5) into (2), partially differentiate relative to tφ , and set the result to zero.)  The 
speculator acts as a Stackelberg leader if he sets etφ , and tφ  gets determined endogenously.  The 
Stackelberg equilibrium is again equation (6).  (To see this, insert (4) into (3), partially 
differentiate relative to etφ , set the result to zero, and then plug the resulting expression for the 
expected volume of intervention into (4).) 
 
3. Equilibrium intervention and central bank independence 
 
Central bank independence to conduct monetary policy has been related to low inflation rates 
with no consequences to economic growth (Grilli et al. 1991, Alesina and Summers 1993, 
Cukierman 1992, Eijffinger and Haan 1996, Jacome 2001, and Jacome and Vasquez 2005).  Yet 
independence can also be interpreted in terms of exchange rate management, in which case 
heightened independence is associated with lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market.  
This issue will be our major concern in this section.  We will also consider whether intervention 
leans against the wind or leans with the wind. 
In terms of the model in Section 2, here we focus on parameter γ.  This parameter gauges 
the importance the central bank places in preventing exchange rate fluctuations away from its 
target.  In the monetary policy game literature, the parameter associated with the importance 
given to output stability is seen as the inverse of the degree of central bank independence 
(Rogoff 1985).  The idea behind this is that the central bank knows that in the long run it cannot 
systematically stimulate output by means of surprise inflation.  So it will only engage in larger-
than-expected monetary expansions if it is forced to do so by politicians and if it is not protected 
from their influence by law.  Similarly, if the central bank lacks independence, it is frequently 
forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market.  The more independent a central bank is, the 
lesser it is influenced by political pressure to counteract speculative shocks to the exchange rate.  
Our model in Section 2 tracks such a stylized fact because parameter γ is negatively related to 
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equilibrium intervention in equation (6).  Likewise the greater the central bank independence, the 
lower the variability of intervention volume (Almekinders 1995). 
Analogous to the negative relationship between inflation rate and central bank 
independence, Almekinders (1995) finds evidence favoring a negative relationship between 
foreign exchange intervention and central bank independence for 20 industrialized countries.  He 
employs changes in currency reserves as proxies for intervention, and uses the central bank 
independence index of Eijffinger and Schaling (1993).  A negative relationship is found for the 
variability of intervention and independence.  However, the use of changes in reserves as a good 
proxy for intervention activity can be criticized on the basis that they are too noisy and that 
reserves can change for reasons having nothing to do with intervention.  For instance, if the 
currency of a country depreciates, this will automatically increase the relative value of any 
foreign exchange holdings in central bank’s portfolio.  In such a situation the positive correlation 
between intervention (proxied by reserve changes) and lack of central bank independence could 
be explained by the fact that countries with a lesser independent central bank have more 
expansionary (and variable) monetary policy, which in turn leads to a more depreciating (and 
volatile) exchange rate, and therefore to larger (and more variable) foreign reserves. 
Rather than relying on net foreign reserves, we take policy rule (1) to proxy for 
intervention and extend Almekinders’ results to the emerging markets of Latin America. We 
consider 13 countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and take 
monthly data over the period January 1990−December 2003 (the only available).  The source is 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  The central bank (legal) independence index is that of 
Jacome and Vasquez (2005).  This index takes into account not only economic and political 
sovereignty (as in Cukierman 1992) but also financial sovereignty, responsibility, transparency, 
and the role of the central bank as a lender in the last resort. 
Latin America recently pursued more central bank independence through major reforms, 
mainly in Argentina (1992 and 2002), Bolivia (1995), Chile (1989), Colombia (1992), Costa 
Rica (1995), Mexico (1993), Paraguay (1995), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1995), and Venezuela 
(1992 and 2001).  Table 1 shows the countries’ central bank intervention index taking into 
account the reforms.  Reform countries are indicated with a “0” (pre-reform sub-period) or “1” 
(post-reform sub-period).  We assessed the relationship between central bank independence and 
intervention employing both individual-country estimation (Table 2) and cross-country 
estimation through panel data (Table 3). 
In the individual country estimation, policy rule (1) was used to proxy for intervention.  
Actually we replaced nominal money supply deviation from its target with a target for nominal 
interest rate iT.  We also stylized departures of nominal exchange rate from its target as the 
deviations of real exchange rate R from its PPP value of one.  This is justified because a central 
bank’s main concern is to counteract speculative nominal exchange rate changes.  The modified 
rule in natural logs is then ( ) ( )ln ln 1Tt ti Rφ= −                                                                                                           (9) 
The intervention coefficients employed were obtained by individually estimating (via 
OLS) equation (9) for every country (Table 2).  Data on nominal interest rates, nominal 
exchange rates, and price levels were collected from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  In 
Table 2, ∆ represents a series’ first differences in natural logs, and D is deviation of the real 
exchange rate from the PPP value of one.  Estimates in the regressions of Table 2 were backed 
by standard econometric treatment.  To preventing spourious regressions, ADF and Phillips-
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Peron tests were employed in order to check for stationarity.  We also run a CUSUM test to 
check for parameter stability.  Moreover, whenever autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in 
residuals were detected, they were fixed through Newey-West correction. 
That leaning against the wind is the usual type of intervention can be seen in the negative 
sign of the deviations of the real exchange rate from its PPP value of one in the regressions for 
Argentina(1), Bolivia(1), Brazil, Chile, Colombia(0 and 1), Paraguay(1), Peru, and Venezuela(0 
and 1) (Table 2).  The positive sign of the regressions in Table 2 refers to the countries with 
leaning-with-the-wind intervention. 
With an endogenous intervention the target variable becomes the central bank 
independence index.  Here one can think of a banking crisis dummy, for instance, as one control 
variable.  Countries experiencing crises over the period were Argentina (2002), Colombia 
(1998−1999), Dominican Republic (2002−2003), Mexico (1995), Uruguay (2002), and 
Venezuela (1994−1995).  However, since central bank reforms are usually part of broader 
structural reforms that include privatizations, trade reform, and other structural macro policies 
(Jacome and Vasquez 2005), there is a possible omitted variable bias if one considers only the 
banking crisis dummy.  To circumvent this, we considered the index of structural reform of the 
Inter-American Development Bank as an extra control variable (Lora 2001, Lora and Panizza 
2002). 
The four panels in Table 3 show a negative relationship between the foreign exchange 
intervention coefficient and the central bank independence index over the period 1990−2003.  
The coefficients were estimated by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and robust 
coefficient covariances (White robust covariances), allowing for heteroscedasticity across 
countries and computing White-type robust standard errors, together with an AR(1) 
autocorrelation structure within countries, with a ρ coefficient common to all countries. 
Regression [1] considered only the central bank index, regression [2] added the structural 
reform index, and regression [3] alternatively added the banking crisis dummy.  Regression [4] 
took all these into account.  Apart from the dummy for banking crisis, Table 3 shows that the 
variables are related at a significance level of up 10 percent.  Thus the proposition that increased 
central bank independence can be associated with lesser intervention in foreign exchange 
markets holds for Latin America.  Also, the structural reforms helped to reduce the need for 
foreign exchange intervention.  The banking crises did not matter for intervention, however.  
Indeed the R2 in regression [3] suggests that nearly 79 percent of the changes occurring in the 
intervention coefficient can be explained solely by the independence and structural reform 
indices. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
We evaluate Latin American foreign exchange intervention in a framework where the exchange 
rate regime is endogenous and there exists an inefficient, equilibrium foreign exchange 
intervention bias.  The intervention bias appears in an exchange rate policy game regardless of 
the (first-mover) status of the players (central bank vs market participants).  The model suggests 
that greater central bank independence is associated with both (1) lesser intervention in the 
foreign exchange market and (2) leaning-against-the-wind intervention.  Equilibrium 
intervention is of the leaning-against-the-wind type if the central bank considers exchange rate 
management more important than domestic residents’ wellbeing.  Both results are confirmed by 
data from 13 Latin American countries.  Our findings are thus in accordance with those of 
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Almekinders for industrialized countries, who employed OLS cross-country regressions and took 
foreign reserves as a proxy for intervention.  We dismiss the use of reserves and assess the 
relationship between central bank independence and intervention employing both individual-




 Time Period CBII 
Group 1  0.84 
ARG−1 1993−2003  
BOL−1 1996−2003  
CHI 1990−2002  
COL−1 1993−2003  
MEX−1 1994−2003  
PER−1 1994−2003  
   
Group 2  0.70 
CRC−1 1996−2003  
PAR−1 1996−2003  
URU−1 1996−2003  
VEN−1 1993−2003  
   
Group 3  0.44 
ARG−0 1990−1992  
BOL−0 1990−1995  
BRA 1990−2003  
COL−0 1990−1992  
CRC−0 1990−1995  
GUA 1990−2003  
DOM 1990−2003  
MEX−0 1990−1993  
PAR−0 1990−1995  
PER−0 1990−1993  
URU−0 1990−1995  
VEN−0 1990−1992  
 
Table 1.  Latin American central bank 
independence and reform 
 
Notes 
Reform countries are indicated with a “0” 
(pre-reform sub-period) or “1” (post-reform 
sub-period) 
CBII is central bank independence index 
Source: Jacome and Vasquez (2005)  
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∆iT    =  1.3621* ∆D                              Adjusted R2 = 0.45                                  (ARG−0)   
            (8.75)          
 
lniT  = −0.18* lnD                                Adjusted R2 = 0.03                                  (ARG−1)   
            (−3.65) 
 
lniT =  0.006* + 0.805* lnD                 Adjusted R2 = 0.24                                  (BOL−0)   
           (2.45)      (2.58)     
 
lniT  = −0.050* lnD                              Adjusted R2 = 0.02                                  (BOL−1)   
             (−3.50) 
 
lniT  = 1.336* − 0.0512* lnD               Adjusted R2 = 0.03                                   (BRA)   
         (7.54)      (–2.73)    
 
              
lniT  = 1.456* − 0.216* lnD                 Adjusted R2 = 0.33                                   (CHI)   
         (11.24)      (–10.6)    
 
 
∆iT    =  0.02*  + 0.048* ∆D                 Adjusted R2 = 0.14                                   (COL−0)   
           (2.72)     (2.29)     
 
lniT  = 0.404* − 0.238* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.77                                   (COL−1)   
            (26.03)      (−13.42) 
 
∆iT    = 0.51* ∆D                                  Adjusted R2 = 0.17                                   (CRC−0)   
          (2.43)          
 
lniT  = −0.05* lnD                               Adjusted R2 = 0.13                                   (CRC−1)   
             (−4.18) 
 
∆iT    =  −0.38*  + 0.155* ∆D               Adjusted R2 = 0.46                                       (DOM)   
          (−6.43)      (9.12)      
 
    
∆iT    =  0.116* ∆D                               Adjusted R2 = 0.06                                       (GUA)   
          (6.52)      
 
 
lniT =  −1.44* + 0.675* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.65                                  (MEX−0)   
           (−3.35)     (3.84)     
 
lniT  = −1.22* + 0.599* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.71                                  (MEX−1)   
             (−8.62)     (9.78)                                  
 
lniT =  0.019* lnD                               Adjusted R2 = 0.005                                 (PAR−0)   
           (12.3)     
 
lniT  = −1.33* ∆D                               Adjusted R2 = 0.71                                   (PAR−1)   
             (−3.54)         
 
lniT =  0.807* lnD                               Adjusted R2 = 0.003                                 (PER−0)   
           (3.67)     
 
lniT  = 0.435* − 0.265* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.19                                   (PER−1)   
            (4.75)        (−3.10) 
 
∆iT   =  1.443* ∆D                                Adjusted R2 = 0.41                                   (URU−0)   
           (6.80)          
 
∆iT   =  0.369* ∆D                                Adjusted R2 = 0.03                                   (URU−1)   
            (3.43) 
 
lniT =  2.43* − 0.271* lnD                  Adjusted R2 = 0.28                                   (VEN−0)   
          (2.37)    (−2.04)     
 
lniT  = −0.049* lnD                             Adjusted R2 = 0.07                                   (VEN−1)   
             (−26.52) 
Table 2.  Policy rule: individual-country regressions 
Note: * means significance at the 5 percent level, and figures in brackets show the t-statistic 
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Regression [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant 0.0008* 
     (66.82) 
0.000* 
      (67.07) 
0.0008* 
   (58.03) 
0.0008* 
     (51.39) 
Central Bank Independence Index −0.199* 
     (−2.53) 
−0.176* 
     (−2.03) 
−20.05* 
   (−2.49) 
−20.06* 
    (−2.48) 
Structural Reform Index  −2.20E−0.7**
  (−1.76) 
 −0.02** 
    (−2.52) 
Dummy for Banking Crisis   −0.03 
     (−0.75) 
−0.03 
       (−0.75) 
     
R2 0.033 0.79 0.032 0.030 
Observations 2.184 2.184 2.184 2.184 
Number of Countries 13 13 13 13 
ρ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
 
Table 3. Panel regressions using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
 
Note 
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